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This paper assessed whether belief in conspiracy theories was associated with a
particularly cognitive style (worldview).The sample comprised 223 volunteers recruited via
convenience sampling and included undergraduates, postgraduates, university employees,
and alumni. Respondents completed measures assessing a range of cognitive-perceptual
factors (schizotypy, delusional ideation, and hallucination proneness) and conspiratorial
beliefs (general attitudes toward conspiracist thinking and endorsement of individual
conspiracies). Positive symptoms of schizotypy, particularly the cognitive-perceptual factor,
correlated positively with conspiracist beliefs. The best predictor of belief in conspiracies
was delusional ideation. Consistent with the notion of a coherent conspiratorial mindset,
scores across conspiracy measures correlated strongly. Whilst ﬁndings supported the
view that belief in conspiracies, within the sub-clinical population, was associated with
a delusional thinking style, cognitive-perceptual factors in combination accounted for only
32% of the variance.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of conspiracism is important for myriad reasons. Con-
spiracy theories persist within the general population (Goertzel,
1994), are frequently endorsed, and may inﬂuence perceptions of
signiﬁcant contemporary (e.g., transmission of ebola) and histor-
ical real world events (e.g., moon landings; Swami et al., 2010).
Illustratively, Stempel et al. (2007) found that 36% of American
respondents believed it was at least somewhat likely that their
government assisted, or took no action to stop the 9/11 attacks.
Soni (2007) reported comparable results in Britain following the
7/7 bombings. Correspondingly, almost a third of the Ameri-
can population believed that Barack Obama unconstitutionally
ascended to the US presidency (Uscinski et al., 2011). Whilst, con-
spiracy theories are not always false (e.g.,Watergate), they typically
lack evidential support and are generally resistant to falsiﬁcation
(Sutton and Douglas, 2014). Thus, the fact that conspiracies gain
social support demonstrates the appealing, persuasive, and plau-
sible nature of conspiracist ideas (Byford and Billig, 2001). Belief
in conspiracies may also effect behavior and have important social
consequences, such as diminished social engagement (society, pol-
itics, health behaviors, climate change, etc.; Butler et al., 1995; Bird
and Bogart, 2005; Jolley and Douglas, 2014).
Despite awealth of research, there is noone single, accepteddef-
inition of conspiracy (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). Quintessen-
tially, theories involve the assumption of collusion, when other
elucidations are more credible (Aaronovitch, 2009). This typically,
manifests as the belief that multiple actors cooperate in order
to orchestrate a malevolent plot (Barron et al., 2014). Conspir-
acy endorsement occurs, when either no deﬁnitive explanation
for an event exists, or the ofﬁcial account appears inadequate
(Drinkwater et al., 2012).
The purpose of the present paper was to extend recent work
examining relationships between cognitive-perceptual variables
personality factors (schizotypy: Darwin et al., 2011; Barron et al.,
2014; reality testing: Dagnall et al., 2010a; and paranoia: Dar-
win et al., 2011) and the propensity to validate conspiracist beliefs
(Darwin et al., 2011; Swami, 2012; Swami and Furnham, 2012;
Brotherton et al., 2013). Schizotypy is a multifactorial psycho-
logical construct, covering cognitive, perceptual, and affective
domains. Schizotypal traits include suspicion, magical thinking,
social anxiety, and paranoia. These factors potentially predis-
pose individuals toward odd and unusual beliefs (Barlow et al.,
2009; Darwin et al., 2011). Schizotypy has been deﬁned in dif-
ferent ways, as a milder form of schizophrenia (Rado, 1953;
Meehl, 1962), a personality dimension (Eysenck, 1960), and both
a healthy variation and a predisposition to psychosis (Claridge,
1997). The latter two perspectives (personality and dual models)
are germane to the present paper because they suggest schizotypal
traits inﬂuence cognitive-perceptual processing within the gen-
eral population, and contribute to the formation/maintenance of
unorthodox/anomalous beliefs (Dagnall et al., 2010b).
Indeed, previous research evinces that individuals scoring
higher on positive schizotypy possess stronger belief in anoma-
lous phenomena (generally; Simmonds-Moore, 2010), and the
paranormal (speciﬁcally; Genovese, 2005; Hergovich and Aren-
dasy, 2007; Hergovich et al., 2008). This summation, however, is
overly simplistic and scrutiny reveals a subtle and more sophisti-
cated relationship. There is evidence to suggest that associations
between belief in the paranormal and schizotypal factors varies as
a function of belief type (Irwin andGreen, 1998–1999). Cognitive-
perceptual scores are associated with New Age Philosophy, whilst
interpersonal deﬁcits relate to belief in extraordinary life forms
and witchcraft. Cognitive disorganization inﬂuences evaluation
of paranormal experiences rather than belief (Irwin, 2009).
These ﬁndings extrapolate usefully to the study of conspir-
acy theories, where studies show a robust relationship between
conspiracist ideation and schizotypy (Bruder et al., 2013; Swami
et al., 2013; Barron et al., 2014). Pertinently, Darwin et al. (2011)
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 206 | 1
Dagnall et al. Conspiracy theory and cognitive style
found conspiratorial beliefs correlated positively with paranormal
beliefs, paranoid ideation, and schizotypy. Conﬁrmatory analysis
revealed schizotypy and paranoid ideation to be important fea-
tures of conspiratorial thinking. Barron et al. (2014) expanded on
these ﬁndings by proposing that schizotypal individuals, because
of heightened suspiciousness, are more open to arguments in sup-
port of conspiracy theories (Darwin et al., 2011). Holm (2009)
explained this ‘paranoia-conspiracy link’ in terms of shared, over-
lapping characteristics. Holm (2009) contends that key tenets of
conspiracism (i.e., suspicion and constant fear of external agents)
are central characteristics of paranoia.
Darwin et al. (2011) expands upon this idea by proposing that
paranoid anxiety may serve an adaptive function. Characteris-
tics associated with paranoid ideation (e.g., low trust, feelings
of vulnerability, and belief in the harmful intent of others) may
assist the ability to detect potential social threats (Freeman et al.,
2005; Gilbert et al., 2005). More pessimistically, the relation-
ship between paranoia and conspiracist thinking may arise from
distorted perception and misappreciation of intention/causation
(Meller, 2002).
Collectively, studies suggest that believers in conspiracy theories
share a propensity to paranoia. However, this supposition is con-
tentious.Whilst, paranoid ideation and conspiratorial beliefs share
common features, analysis reveals crucial differences (see Byford,
2011). A key dissimilarity being the non-personal nature of con-
spiracist ideation, typically paranoid thoughts are self-referenced
and focus on the notion of individual threat. Additionally, fear
affects conspiracists and individuals suffering from paranoid delu-
sions differently. Conspiracists typically resist and ﬁght, whereas
paranoid individuals withdraw. Finally, whilst paranoid delu-
sions are personal, idiosyncratic, and considered implausible,
conspiracist beliefs reﬂect key social events/themes and are often
credible.
These differences, together with the observation that con-
spiracist beliefs are prevalent within the normal population,
indicate that explanations attributing conspiracism to negative
psychopathology are unsatisfactory. Clearly, conspiracies repre-
sent more than just the hallucinations of a deluded, paranoid
minority (van der Linden, 2013). A recent study by Wood
et al. (2012) may provide a useful framework for contextualiz-
ing conspiracism. They foundparticipants endorsed contradictory
conspiracy theories. (e.g., the more participants believed Princess
Diana faked her own death, the more they believed she was
murdered). The authors explained this in terms of coherence
with higher-order beliefs (e.g., perceived deception by author-
ity). Adherence to principal beliefs was more important than the
congruence of sub-beliefs.
Recent psychological research supports the notion that central,
overarching belief systems are important with regard to the accep-
tance of conspiracy theories (Wood and Douglas, 2013). In this
context, the notion of a conspiracist worldview is important. Gen-
erally, worldview refers to a set of interrelated assumptions about
the nature of the world (Overton, 1991), which act as an interpre-
tive lens for understanding reality and existence (Miller and West,
1993; see Koltko-Rivera, 2004 for detailed review). Speciﬁcally,
the conspiracist worldview is deﬁned by high-order beliefs (i.e.,
mistrust of authority, the conviction that nothing is quite as
it seems, and deception), which facilitate conspiracist thinking
(Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2012). Thence,
the rejection of ofﬁcial accounts is more important than details of
individual conspiracy theories.
The worldview concept relates to the notion of conspiracy
mentality (Imhoff and Bruder, 2014). Imhoff and Bruder (2014)
proposed that endorsement of a speciﬁc conspiracy theory largely
depends on whether an individual accepts conspiratorial beliefs
generally. From this perspective, the conspiracy mentality pro-
duces a generalized political attitude associatedwith the behavioral
intention to challenge the status quo and a pejorative view of
those in power. In contrast to right-wing authoritarianism and
social dominance orientation, conspiracy mentality is related to
prejudice against high-power groups that are perceived as less like-
able and more threatening than low-power groups. Such traits,
however, do not necessarily produce paranoia, and resistance
to rational argument. Indeed, when the conspiracy mentality
manifests as a desire to seek truth and social advancement it is
adaptive.
Given the outlined characteristics of the conspiracist worldview
it is likely to incline participants away from analytical-rational
processing (reality testing) toward intuitive-experiential process-
ing (Drinkwater et al., 2012). In this context, Pacini and Epstein
(1999) and Norris and Epstein (2011) provide a precise delin-
eation of thinking styles. Rational-analytical processing is slow,
conscious, considered, and nuanced, whilst intuitive-experiential
processing is fast, largely preconscious, holistic, spontaneous, and
fairly crude (Irwin and Wilson, 2013).
The latter thinking style would appear to be consistent with
the validation of conspiratorial thinking. Indeed, Drinkwater et al.
(2012) found reality testing and belief in the paranormal predicted
endorsement of General Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) and speciﬁc
conspiracies. Proneness to reality deﬁcits and belief in the paranor-
mal were associated with less critical ratings of conspiracy theories
(lower truthfulness ratings for ofﬁcial explanations, and posi-
tive evaluations of alternative explanations). The tendency toward
intuitive-experiential processing may explain recent ﬁndings that
belief in conspiracy theories was associated with rejection of sci-
ence (Lewandowsky et al., 2013). Endorsement of conspiracies,
therefore results from deference to higher-order beliefs and the
failure to appraise thoroughly evidence. Thus, it would appear that
elements of conspiracist ideation are adversative to conventional
reasoning and scientiﬁc thinking.
The notion of a ‘conspiracist worldview’ is demonstrated fur-
ther by the observation that conspiracism is not limited to speciﬁc
conspiracy theories, but rather generalizes across conspiracies;
individuals who endorse one conspiracy tend to approve oth-
ers (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2011; Drinkwater et al., 2012;
Lewandowsky et al., 2013). One theory provides evidence for
another, reciprocally reinforcing/perpetuating the system (Swami
et al., 2011). This effect occurs to the extent that even deliber-
ately deceptive conspiracies (i.e., Red Bull) are endorsed (Swami
et al., 2011). Several important papers have viewed these ﬁnd-
ings as support for Goertzel’s (1994) assertion that conspiracies
form part of a monological belief system, a structure that provides
easy, automatic explanation for new phenomena, which otherwise
would threaten the belief system. However, a recent chapter by
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Sutton and Douglas (2014) questions this assumption. Partic-
ularly, they point out that there are major problems with the
monological belief systems position: conspiracy theories are not
necessarily mutually supportive, there is a lack of empirical evi-
dence, and alternatives are more plausible. For this reason, the
term conspiratorial mindset was preferred.
The present paper examined the notion of conspiracist cog-
nitive style (worldview). Particularly, the authors hypothesized
that conspiracist ideation would be associated with higher scores
on a range of cognitive-perceptual measures, particularly those
tapping into positive schizotypy. To facilitate comparisons with
recent published studies schizotypy (Darwin et al., 2011) and
delusional ideation (Brotherton et al., 2013) were included. More-
over, the addition of proneness to hallucinations (Launay and
Slade, 1981) provided a measure of source monitoring error;
assessed the degree to which internally generated imagery is
wrongly (misattributed) to an external source (see French et al.,
2008). Together, these measures tap into aspects of reality test-
ing; the degree to which, sensory experience is critically assessed
(Langdon and Coltheart, 2000) and the plausibility of beliefs
evaluated (Irwin, 2004). This hypothesis is consistent with Irwin
(2009),whonoted that high cognitive-perceptual scoreswere asso-
ciated with a preference toward intuitive-experiential thinking.
Using a range of measures allowed the researchers to iden-
tify, which particular cognitive-perceptual factor(s) were mostly
strongly associated with conspiratorial ideation. Previous research
has employed these factors independently and thus, it is cur-
rently unclear which cognitive-perceptual factor(s) best predict
conspiracist ideation.
The present paper employed a range of conspiracist mea-
sures because there is no single/accepted measure of conspiracy
theory endorsement (Bruder et al., 2013, Sutton and Douglas,
2014). Together, these scales assessed a breadth of conspiracist
ideation. This approach had the beneﬁt of facilitating com-
parisons with previous work, and ensured that ﬁndings were
not merely an artifact of the measure employed. If conspir-
acy theories represent a conspiratorial mindset correlations will
be evident both between (broad vs. individual) and within




The sample comprised 223 volunteers recruited by researchers
in Manchester and the West Midlands using convenience sam-
pling. The mean age was 27.79 years (SD = 12.15) with a range
of 18–81 years. Participants included undergraduates, postgrad-
uates, alumni, and employees from the Manchester Metropolitan
University.
COGNITIVE-PERCEPTUAL MEASURES
The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ-B; Raine and
Benishay, 1995)
The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ-B) is a widely
used, easy-to-administer research tool (Bailey and Swallow, 2004),
which assesses schizotypal personality disorder, or dimensional
schizotypy in non-clinical samples (Jahshan and Sergi, 2007). The
SPQ-B is a short version of the 74-itemSPQ.The SPQ-B comprises
three subscales (cognitive-perceptual, eight items; interpersonal,
eight items; and disorganized, six items). Items are presented as
statements responded to with “yes” or “no” answers. Yes responses
are totalled to produce a score ranging from 0 to 22; upper
scores indicate higher levels of self-reported schizotypy. The SPQ-
B has established psychometric properties: internal consistency
reliability, test–retest reliability, and criterion validity (Raine and
Benishay, 1995; Axelrod et al., 2001).
The Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI-21; Peters and Garety,
1996; Peters et al., 2004)
The Peters et al. Delusions Inventory-21 measure consists of
21 items with a yes/no response format and assesses delu-
sional ideation in non-clinical populations (Verdoux and van
Os, 2002). Particularly, the PDI-21 comprises items measuring:
religiosity, persecution, grandiosity, paranormal beliefs, thought
disturbances, suspiciousness, paranoid ideation, negative self,
depersonalization, catastrophic ideation, and thought broadcast,
and ideation of reference and inﬂuence (Peters et al., 1999). In
addition to the occurrence of delusional ideation, the PDI-21
(using a 5-point scale) also measures level of distress (1 = not
at all distressing, 5 = very distressing), preoccupation (1 = hardly
ever think about it, 5 = think about it all the time), and con-
viction (1 = don’t believe it’s true, 5 = believe it is absolutely
true). Scores on each dimension range from 0 to 105. Summation
of occurrence and dimensional scores produces a composite total
(0–336). The scale possesses satisfactory psychometric properties
(Jones and Fernyhough, 2007). The PDI-21 has an internal reli-
ability of 0.82, and conﬁrmed test retest reliability (Peters et al.,
2004).
The Launay–Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS; Launay and Slade,
1981; Bentall and Slade, 1985)
The Launay–Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS) assesses inclination
to hallucinations in normal individuals (the measure assumes that
hallucination experience exists on a continuum with psycholog-
ical functioning; Slade and Bentall, 1988). The scale contains 12
items, presented as statements. Responses are recorded on a 5-
point likert scale, ranging from 0 (certainly does not apply to me)
to 4 (certainly applies to me). The LSHS has a total score of 36
(higher scores indicate a greater disposition to hallucination-like
experiences). Jones et al. (2009) note that the LSHS satisfactory
psychometric properties (internal consistency coefﬁcient = 0.82
(Aleman et al., 2001).
CONSPIRATORIAL BELIEF MEASURES
General Conspiracist Beliefs
Five items measured the degree to which respondents believed that
conspiracy theories accurately depict real life events and contain
truthful information (e.g., ‘I have heard several conspiracy theories
which I believe to be true’; Drinkwater et al., 2012). Responses
were measured on a 7-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree,
4 = neither disagree nor agree, 7 = strongly agree). To control for
response bias, the measure contains two reversed items. The GCB
has demonstrated internal reliability = 0.72 (Drinkwater et al.,
2012).
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Endorsement of speciﬁc conspiracy theories
Ten historical events (e.g., the death of Diana Princess of Wales,
the assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy) selected randomly
from lists of famous conspiracies, assessed endorsement of speciﬁc
conspiracist beliefs (Vankin and Whalen, 2010; Drinkwater et al.,
2012). Two questions followed an outline of each event. Question
1 asked participants to rate the truthfulness of the ofﬁcial expla-
nation (CTO; measured by a 7-point likert scale: 1 = deﬁnitely
not true, 7 = deﬁnitely true), and question 2 asked participants
to rate truthfulness of alternative explanations (CTA), the extent
to which respondents believed alternative explanations were more
truthful than ofﬁcial accounts (measured by a 7-point likert scale:
1 = strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). Scores on the truth-
fulness sub-scale were reversed in relation to the other conspiracy
measures. Hence, high conspiratorial ideation was associated with
low endorsement of ofﬁcial explanations. These sub-scales have
previously demonstrated adequate internal reliability: CTO= 0.79
and CTA = 0.79 (Drinkwater et al., 2012).
Conspiracy Theory Questionnaire (Bruder and Manstead, 2009, see
Darwin et al., 2011)
This study used an adapted version of the Conspiracy Theory
Questionnaire (CTQ) consisting of 38 items. This measured gen-
eral belief in conspiracy theory. Participants responded to items
(e.g., “there are specialized government services who attempt to
harass UFO witnesses into silence”), using an 11-point likert scale
(0 = Certainly Not to 100% = Certainly). Possible scores, ranged
from 0 to 3800). This measure has excellent internal consistency
of 0.96 (Darwin et al., 2011).
PROCEDURE
Prior to testing ethical approval was granted as part of a wider
research project examining the relationship between anoma-
lous beliefs and cognitive-perceptual measures. Potential par-
ticipants read the information sheet prior to consenting to the
study. After providing informed consent, participants received
the booklet containing the measures. The instructions asked
participants to take their time and answer questions as openly
and honestly as possible. The booklet was divided into three
sections: personal information (always completed ﬁrst), cognitive-
perceptual measures and conspiracy measures (the order of these




Descriptive statistics for cognitive-perceptual and conspiratorial
measures appear in Table 1. SPQ-B subscale scores (cognitive-
perceptual, interpersonal, and disorganized) feature alongside the
full-scale score. The PDI-21 produced ﬁve scores: item total (yes-
no), distress (D), preoccupation (P), conviction (C), and grand
total (the summation of the four scores). The ﬁnal cognitive-
perceptual measure, the LSHS, provided an overall score assessing
hallucination proneness. Conspiratorial ideation was assessed via
a General Conspiratorial Belief (GBC) measure, the CTQ, and
endorsement of individual conspiracy theories (evaluated via two
scales measuring the degree to which respondents endorsed the
Table 1 | Scale descriptive statistics.
Measure Mean SD Minimum–Maximum α
Cognitive perceptual measures
SPQ 6.69 4.38 0–18 0.80
Cognitive-perceptual 2.51 1.97 0–7 0.70
Interpersonal 2.59 2.25 0–8 0.76
Disorganized 1.60 1.59 0–6 0.66
PDI-21 (yes/no) 3.71 3.04 0–16 0.75
Distress 8.37 8.52 0–55 0.78
Preoccupation 9.18 9.22 0–53 0.78
Conviction 11.06 10.53 0–54 0.78
Total PDI 32.33 30.36 0–173 0.93
LSHS 12.29 7.93 0–38 0.82
Conspiratorial ideation measures
GCB 3.60 1.14 1.00–6.60 0.80
CTQ 44.13 17.64 4.74–93.42 0.96
Ofﬁcial 4.91 1.12 1.70–7.00 0.85
Alternative 3.27 1.16 1.00–7.00 0.87
SPQ, Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire; PDI-21, Peter’s Delusional Ideation;
LSHS, Launay–Slade Hallucination Scale; GCB, general conspiratorial belief;
CTQ, ConspiracyTheory Questionnaire; Ofﬁcial, endorsement of ofﬁcial account;
Alternative, endorsement of alternative accounts.
ofﬁcial account and the degree to which they endorsed alternative
theories). Scale internal reliability was in the acceptable (0.66) to
excellent (0.93) range (George and Mallery, 2003).
Conspiratorial measures
Pearson Moment correlations revealed signiﬁcant correlations
between conspiracy measures (GBC, conspiracy theory endorse-
ment, and attitudes towards speciﬁc theories) see Table 2.
Within individual conspiracies, all correlations were signiﬁcant
and ranged between 0.50 and 0.81. Individual conspiracy theories
also correlated positively (Table 3).
Cognitive-perceptual and conspiratorial measure correlations
Pearson Product Moment correlations examined relationships
between cognitive-perceptual and conspiratorial ideation mea-
sures (see Table 4). Cognitive-perceptual measures (SPQ-B,
Table 2 | Conspiracy measure correlations.
1 2 3 4
(1) GCB
(2) CTQ 0.56**
(3) Ofﬁcial −0.50** −0.53**
(4) Alternative 0.59** 0.63** 0.81**
GCB, general conspiratorial belief; CTQ, Conspiracy Theory Questionnaire; Ofﬁ-
cial, endorsement of ofﬁcial account; Alternative, endorsement of alternative
accounts; **p < 0.01.
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Table 3 | Individual conspiracy theories correlations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
(1) JFK
(2) Apollo 11 0.41**
(3) Elvis 0.23** 0.40**
(4) Roswell 0.37** 0.47** 0.44**
(5) Diana 0.47** 0.49** 0.34** 0.37**
(6) Marilyn 0.41** 0.43** 0.23* 0.41** 0.61**
(7) Political 0.30** 0.40** 0.23* 0.34** 0.49** 0.41**
(8) Hitler 0.28** 0.43** 0.37** 0.40** 0.47** 0.50** 0.39**
(9) Climate 0.29** 0.38** 0.41** 0.40** 0.37** 0.36** 0.43** 0.39**
(10)WTC 0.40** 0.51** 0.42** 0.36** 0.50** 0.42** 0.47** 0.45** 0.42**
(11) GCB 0.39** 0.48** 0.37** 0.40** 0.47** 0.36** 0.37** 0.43** 0.29** 0.45**
(12) CTQ 0.43** 0.40** 0.24** 0.40** 0.55** 0.45** 0.50** 0.41** 0.33** 0.54** 0.56**
JFK, Kennedy assignation; Apollo 11, moon landing; Elvis, death of Elvis Presley; Roswell, Roswell incident; Diana, Death of Diana Princess ofWales; Marilyn, Death
of Marilyn Munroe; Political, political manipulation of the masses; Hitler, Death of Adolf Hitler; Climate, global warming;WTC,WorldTrade Centre attack; GCB, General
Conspiracist Beliefs; CTQ, Conspiracy Theory Questionnaire. **p < 0.01.
Table 4 | Correlations conspiracy measures and cognitive-perceptual measures.
CP INT DIS SPQ PDI-21 D P C Total PDI LSHS
GCB 0.33** 0.11 0.12** 0.25** 0.27** 0.27** 0.27** 0.26** 0.28** 0.19**
CTQ 0.36** 0.18** 0.18** 0.32** 0.44** 0.38** 0.43** 0.45** 0.44** 0.31**
Ofﬁcial −0.26** −0.05 −0.10 −0.18** −0.33** −0.31** −0.35** −0.37** −0.36** −0.13*
Alternative 0.35** 0.10 0.19** 0.28** 0.42** 0.43** 0.45** 0.45** 0.45** 0.17**
CP, cognitive-perceptual; INT, interpersonal; SPQ, Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire; PDI-21, Peter’s Delusional Ideation; D, Distress; P, Preoccupation; C, Convic-
tion; Total PDI, PDI grand total; LSHS, Launay–Slade Hallucination Scale; GCB, general conspiratorial belief; CTQ = Conspiracy Theory Questionnaire; Ofﬁcial, ofﬁcial
account endorsement; Alternative, endorse alternative theories. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
PDI-21, and LSHS) correlated signiﬁcantly across conspiratorial
measures. The cognitive-perceptual SPQ subscale produced sig-
niﬁcant correlations, whilst the interpersonal and disorganized
factors produced weaker, inconsistent results.
Canonical correlation analysis
Canonical analysis assessed the relationship between cognitive-
perceptual variables (SPQ factors, overall PDI, and LSHS)
and conspiracy measures. Canonical analysis is a multivari-
ate technique that focusses on measuring correlations between
variable clusters. Assessing cluster relationships, rather than
individual correlation coefﬁcients, reduces the likelihood of
Type I error (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). The aim of
canonical analysis is to derive a linear combination (syn-
thetic variable) from each variable set (i.e., cognitive-perceptual
and conspiracy measures), which can be used to discern
relationships between multiple predictor and criterion vari-
ables.
Cognitive-perceptual measures were entered as predictors of
conspiracy measures. The analysis produced four functions with
squared canonical correlations (Rc2) of 0.26, 0.04, 0.02, and 0.01
for each, consecutive function. Across functions the full model
was statistically signiﬁcant, Wilks’s λ = 0.67, F(20,707.39) = 4.38,
p < 0.001. Wilks’s λ represents the unexplained variance of
the overall model, and 1–λ provides the effect size total model.
Using this criterion, the effect size for the four canonical func-
tions was 0.32, indicating the model accounted for 32% of
the shared variance between the variable sets (a medium effect
size).
Dimension reduction analysis tested the hierarchal arrange-
ment of functions. Only the ﬁrst function explaining 26.1% of
variance in the data was signiﬁcant. The standardized canoni-
cal function coefﬁcients and structure coefﬁcients for Function
1 (cognitive-perceptual facets of conspiracist ideation) appear in
Table 5. Functions 2–4, 3–4, and 4 were not statistically sig-
niﬁcant, F(12,566.48) = 1.54, p > 0.05; F(6,430.0) = 1.31,
p > 0.05; and F(2,216.0) = 1.06, p > 0.05, respectively.
Primary contributors to the predictor synthetic variable (con-
spiracy measures) were SPQ cognitive-perceptual and delusional
ideation scores, LSHS provided a secondary contribution. All
criterion variables made primary contributions to the synthetic
criterion variable, possessing structure coefﬁcients greater than
0.45. The squared structure coefﬁcients supported this conclu-
sion.
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Table 5 | Canonical solution for cognitive-perceptual variables as
predictors of conspiracy measures for function 1 (cognitive-perce
ptual facets of conspiracist ideation).
Function 1
Variable Coefficient rs r2s (%)
Conspiratorial ideation
GCB −0.02 0.61 37.21
CTQ 0.50 0.87 75.69
Ofﬁcial 0.12 −0.71 50.41




Cognitive-perceptual 0.30 0.76 57.76
Interpersonal −0.05 0.30 9.00
Disorganized 0.07 0.42 17.64
PDI 0.81 0.96 92.16
LHSH −0.07 0.58 33.64
Structure coefﬁcients (rs ) greater than 0.45 are underlined. Coefﬁcient, standard-
ized canonical function coefﬁcient; rs , structure coefﬁcient; r2s , squared structure
coefﬁcient.
Conspiracism and cognitive-perceptual factors
For completeness, partial correlations assessed the relative con-
tributions of schizotypy and delusional ideation. A signiﬁcant
positive correlation was observed between PDI-21 and CTQ, con-
trolling for SPQ, r = 0.33, df = 219, p < 0.001. Contrastingly,
the correlation between SPQ and CTQ, controlling for PDI-21,
r = 0.10, df = 219, p > 0.05 was not signiﬁcant. This indicated
that the relationship between schizotypy and conspiracist beliefs
was principally attributable to PDI.
DISCUSSION
Ashypothesized, conspiracist thinkingwas associatedwithpositive
schizotypy. The cognitive-perceptual subscale of the SPQ-B (Raine
andBenishay,1995) correlated consistently across conspiracymea-
sures, whilst interpersonal, and disorganized factors produced
weaker, inconsistent relationships. Considering the inﬂuence of
individual measures, delusional ideation was most strongly asso-
ciated with conspiracism. Indeed, schizotypy failed to add unique
variance. This ﬁnding indicated that the correlation between
schizotypy and conspiracism was largely attributable to the SPQs
indirect measurement of delusional ideation.
In the context of the present study, it is worth noting that para-
noia is a central theme within the PDI-21 (Peters and Garety,
1996; Peters et al., 2004); the scale contains multiple items
measuring persecution, suspiciousness, and paranoid ideation.
Thus, generally, ﬁndings concur with Darwin et al. (2011), who
reported a link between paranoid/delusional/ideation and belief
in conspiracies (Jones and Fernyhough, 2007). However, the
notion that schizotypal individuals are more open to arguments
in support of conspiracy theories as a result of heightened
suspiciousness, (Darwin et al., 2011; Barron et al., 2014) is con-
tentious. Suspiciousness per se may bias individuals away from
externally generated arguments toward internally generated or
self-afﬁrmed views of the world but will not necessarily produce
conspiratorial thinking. In this context, conspiracy theories may
conﬁrm rather than shape conspiracist notions.
Clearly, delusional ideation, and belief in conspiracies share
important cognitive characteristics (i.e., unusual beliefs, magi-
cal thinking, fear of external agencies and persecutions). This is
evident when typical features of conspiratorial thinking (world-
view) are considered. Particularly, the conviction that unorthodox
theories/explanations are true, in the face of overwhelming contra-
dictory evidence, and the presumption of deception are prominent
features of conspiracist thinking (e.g., Sunstein and Vermeule,
2009). The PDI-21, however, assesses only certain types of sub-
clinical delusions (Jones and Fernyhough, 2007). Hence, future
studies may wish to investigate which explicit elements (beyond
paranoia) of delusional thinking contribute to the development
and maintenance of conspiratorial thinking. Moreover, the rela-
tionship between paranoia and conspiratorial thinking requires
further explication. For example, recent work by Prooijen andDijk
(2014) found that inducing empathy increased collective paranoia
in the form of conspiracy beliefs.
Whilst, the reporting of an association between conspiracism
and paranoid/delusional ideation is consistent with previous
research (e.g., Holm, 2009; Darwin et al., 2011), further consid-
eration is required. Cognitive-perceptual factors in combination
accounted for only 32% of the variance. Thus, within normal
populations, other variables must also inﬂuence the development
and maintenance of belief in conspiracies (the conspiracist world-
view). This is perhaps, not surprising when the development of
the PDI-21 is considered. The measure assesses tendency to delu-
sional ideation in non-clinical populations and samples as wide a
variety of delusions as possible (Jones and Fernyhough, 2007).
High PDI-21 item endorsement rates within the general pop-
ulation indicate only that delusional themes are present within
conspiractorial ideation and supports the notion that normal and
deluded samples overlap.
Within the present study, strong associations were evident
between conspiracy measures. Not only did general attitudes to
conspiracy theories (GBC) correlate with scores on the CTQ, and
endorsement of speciﬁc conspiracy theories, but also individual
conspiracy theory ratings correlated. These results are support-
ive of a conspiratorial mindset; individuals who endorse one
conspiracy are likely to validate others (Goertzel, 1994; Swami
et al., 2011; Drinkwater et al., 2012). One conspiracy provides evi-
dence for another and beliefs are reciprocally reinforcing (Swami
et al., 2011). The conspiratorial mindset, provides a framework
for accommodating new phenomena, which otherwise would
threaten the belief system (Goertzel, 1994). From this perspec-
tive, conspiracism provides individuals with a sense of ontological
security, order and continuity in life experiences (Giddens, 1991).
This ﬁnding accords with preceding research and is indicative of a
conspiratorial worldview.
Cognitions arising from this system may inﬂuence reasoning
and decision-making. A preference for intuitive-experiential pro-
cessing (Drinkwater et al., 2012) and an adherence to high-order
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beliefs (Wood et al., 2012) is likely to result in a thinking style
(worldview), which is internally coherent, but subjectively ﬂawed
in relation to external evidence.Whilst cognitions, in the context of
conspiracies, are rational (in a bounded sense) and consistent from
the individual’s perspective, they are likely to produce traits resem-
bling the positive symptoms of schizotypy (i.e., ideas of reference,
odd beliefs, magical thinking, and paranoid ideation). Unless
cognitions are unduly disruptive (high schizotypy), the resul-
tant schizotypal symptoms should be viewed as benign/healthy
(Holt et al., 2008). This may explain why some researchers view
traits, such as paranoid anxiety as adaptive (Freeman et al.,
2005).
Clearly, more work is required in this area. Conspiratorial
thinking is complex and more than the mere product of poor
psychopathological functioning. Indeed, recent work views con-
spiracist ideation as a subset of false beliefs that help individual’s
comprehend phenomena outside of their control (Swami and
Furnham, 2014). Even this delineation is problematic because it
assumes wrongly that conspiratorial beliefs are necessarily false,
this may not always be the case. The key point is that endorsement
of non-conventional theories/notions arises from limited consid-
eration, or selective interpretation of available evidence. Likewise,
accepting prevailing accounts without deliberation may represent
illogical reasoning.
In this context, it is important to note that thinking styles
are not exclusive, both intuitive-experiential and analytical-
rational thought contribute to behavior (Pacini andEpstein,1999).
Although, thinking style varies in part with context, people may
have preferences for using one style more routinely. An inclination
towards intuitive-experiential thinking, within the normal popu-
lation, is likely to produce domain speciﬁc truncated reasoning
and irrational beliefs (results in a conspiracist worldview).
Conspiracism is common within modern society and despite
criticism, prevails within the normal population. For these rea-
sons, more research is required. One potential avenue, similar to
work in the area of paranormal belief, may be to examine whether
conspiracism is associated with particular probabilistic reasoning
errors/bias. For example, Leman and Cinnirella (2007) suggest
that people generally believe that signiﬁcant events require major
causes. This heuristic may explain why important social happen-
ings are often the focus of conspiratorial thinking. Indeed, recent
work proposes an association between conspiratorial belief and
domain-general susceptibility to conjunction fallacy (see Brother-
ton and French, 2014). However, because few papers exist further
work is necessary. This area may thus be a fertile and fruitful area
of academic endeavor.
In summary, this paper has produced several important ﬁnd-
ings. Whilst delusional ideation is associated with, conspiratorial
thinking in the sub-clinical population, delusional ideation is
not a major determining factor. Indeed, collectively cognitive-
perceptual factors explained only a relatively small proportion of
the variance in conspiracist ideation. Thus, other variables, such
as preferential thinking style are also likely to inﬂuence the incli-
nation to endorse conspiracist beliefs. In this context, the present
paper suggests that previous research has overemphasized the role
of paranoia. Typically, studies argue that conspiracy theories arise
from a propensity to paranoia. However, the characteristics of
paranoia differ in critical ways from typical paranoid ideation (see
Byford, 2011); they are non-personal, self-referenced, and focus
on the notion of individual threat. Hence, conspiracists typically
resist and ﬁght and their beliefs (often credibly) reﬂect key social
events/themes. Consequently, the conspiracy mentality is often
adaptive and hence manifests in a need to seek truth and social
advancement. This positive view of conspiratorial thinking runs
contrary to the typical pejorative interpretation of conspiracist
ideation.
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